Abstract: Most Principal-Agent models predict that increasing incentives result in higher performance. This paper examines whether this result is valid under real-effort conditions. Exposing the participants to varying strengths of incentives we find an inversely U-shaped relationship between effort levels and incentive intensity, which not only contrasts predictions of standard theory but also observations in previous real effort experiments. We provide a new theoretical explanation for the results within a principal agent model with loss averse agents.
Introduction
The question of optimal incentive schemes in Principal-Agent relationships with hidden action has been the object of research for many years. A well-established result of most standard hidden action models is that higher incentives ceteris paribus lead to higher performance. Field studies and experiments present evidence for this conclusion (Lazear 2000; Paarsch/Shearer 1999; Dickinson 1999) . A frequently cited key concept explaining certain anomalies is motivation crowding out (e.g. Frey 1997) . In this framework two types of motivation are specified, namely intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 2 . The core of the theory in this context is that implementing a performance dependent compensation scheme might strengthen extrinsic incentives while diminishing intrinsic motivation. As a consequence the effect of introducing a variable compensation is ambiguous. Frey (1997) introduces a 1 In these experiments effort choices are typically represented by abstract numbers, which the participants can choose. With higher numbers the agent's pay-off decreases and the principal's pay-off increases. 2 Intrinsic motivation denotes an inner drive to do things (e.g. pleasure) while extrinsic motivation describes a behavior driven by rewards outside the individual. The idea of intrinsic motivation was first introduced by Deci (1971) and deCharms (1968) .
Principal-Agent model including intrinsic motivation. The agent's utility increases in wage and decreases in effort. If the principal implements stronger incentives the impact of the intervention on the agent's effort choice is not clear. Frey distinguishes three effects caused by the principal's intervention namely a price effect, an enhancing effect and a crowding out effect. The price effect simply denotes the effect of higher opportunity costs of lower effort levels. Representing a positive perception of the intervention the enhancing effect amplifies the impact of the price effect. In turn the crowding out effect refers to a negative assessment of the increase of incentives. The principal's intervention undermining the agent's intrinsic motivation produces lower effort choices. Still the net effect is hardly predictable since price and enhancing effect point in the same direction, while the crowding out effect affects the opposite.
Particularly is seems conceivable that for lower interventions the crowding out effect dominates the price effect resulting in reduced effort whereas higher interventions cause increasing effort choices due to the prevailing influence of the price effect 3 .
However the concept of intrinsic motivation is not undisputed among psychologists (e.g. Eisenberger/Cameron 1996; Deci/Koestner/Ryan 1999a; Deci/Koestner/Ryan 1999b) 4 . Especially in experiments with abstract effort choices motivation crowding theory fails to provide sensible explanations, as there is no task stimulating intrinsic motivation.
Another part of the related literature indicates the relevance of reference dependent preferences (e.g. Fehr/Goette 2002; Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein & Thaler 1997) .
Generally the effect of wage variations on labor supply and effort exertion is being examined. Fehr/Goette (2002) find decreasing effort choices with stronger incentives for reference dependent preferences if the reference income has been exceeded. In that case higher piece rates have a diminishing impact on work effort.
The controversial evidence on the effect of incentives in work relationships illustrates that further investigations of this question are necessary.
This paper investigates the influence of varying piece rates on work performance. For that purpose we conducted two real effort experiments at the Universities of Bonn and
Cologne. Real effort conditions were chosen to prevent subjects from restraining on income distribution and to generate noticeable disutility from higher effort. The experimental design of both experiments has been inspired by a real effort experiment conducted by Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a) . They investigated the influence of varying incentives on effort in an IQ-Test task. Participants were separated into four groups.
One group was paid a participation fee only. The other groups were paid the participation fee plus additional 0.1, 1, 3 NIS for every correct answer in the IQ-Test 5 .
The results showing a non-monotonic relation between incentives and scores contradict standard theoretical predictions. The group without any incentives (paid the participation fee only) outperformed the group with additional 0.1 NIS/correct answer.
The two other groups (additional 1 and 3 NIS) yielded significantly higher scores than the 0,1 NIS group. So in total Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a) found a V-shaped relationship between effort and intensity of incentives. Referring to motivation crowding theory one could argue that for the low incentive group the crowding out effect dominated the price effect while for the higher incentive treatment the price effect prevailed. As another explanation Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a) offer an explanation based on of incomplete contracts stating that the fixed wage group thought the work on the IQ-Test to be part of the contract concluded with the experimenters. Introducing the variable compensation 5 NIS=New Isreali Shekel names the Israeli Currency.
completed the contract with regard to meaning of the fixed wage as a show-up fee.
According to Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a) were roughly 6% and 15%. The low payment group produced the worst results. A possible explanation for this is that the incentive parameter was too low in comparison to the fixed wage, so that it was not noticeable and hence could not evolve its full incentive impact. In fact we applied a much higher ratio of fixed to variable wage components to ensure a noticeable wage increase with increasing effort and to check the robustness of the V-shaped relationship.
As motivation crowding out seems to be a possible explanation for the failure of incentive contracts the second key objective of the experiments was to examine how far qualities of tasks can influence the subjects' effort. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design and procedure and develops hypotheses on the results. Furthermore the results are presented and interpreted. In section 3 the model including reference dependency is introduced and developed. The last section concludes.
The real effort experiments

Experimental Set-up and Procedures
The experiments were conducted at the Universities of Bonn and Cologne in November 2002 and July 2003 respectively. In total 209 of the Universities' undergraduate students of various disciplines participated in the experiments. The students were randomly assigned to groups with different tasks and wages. There were six different treatments with two different tasks and three different levels of variable compensation.
For an illustration see Table 1 . The first task was comparable with Gneezy/Rustichini's (2000a) IQ-Test (IQT) consisting of extracts from a book containing exercises for logical training. No special skills were necessary to answer these questions. With the other task (CN) participants were required to count the number of "ones" and "sevens"
out of a block of random numbers put together by a computer program 6 . Table 1 Treatments task/performance-contingent wage 0€ 0.05€ 0.5€ CN IQT All participants were told that they would always get 5€ as a participation fee. The participants of the first two treatments received the participation fee only (No Incentive=NI). The other groups earned an additional 0.05€ (low incentive=LI) and 0.5€ (high incentive=HI) respectively for every point scored 7 .
The subjects who worked on the IQT received a point for every correct answer but 0.5 points were subtracted for any incorrect answer 8 . In the CN an answer was valued correct if it corresponded to the correct number of "ones" and "sevens" respectively with a deviation of one. If the exact number of "ones" in a block was for example 30, subjects who counted 29, 30 or 31 "ones" received one point. After all individuals had entered the corresponding room they were requested to sit down on seats marked with a pen and pieces of paper 9 . After everybody had sat down the supervisors handed out the 6 For an example see appendix. 7 1€ was about 1$ at the time of the experiments. 8 That was to prevent subjects from guessing which seemed to be necessary as there were several multiple-choice questions. 9 In the session at the University of Bonn students were separated according to their payment scheme.
Only participants with the same incentive scheme worked in the same room. In contrast to that exercises. Each of them was covered with a sheet with the instructions printed on 10 . The subjects were given 30 minutes to work on the tasks. After exactly 30 minutes a bell rang and the supervisors handed out forms in which the subjects were asked to fill in their answers. Additionally a questionnaire was fixed to the form 11 . The participants were granted another 5 minutes to copy the answers into the form and answer the questionnaire. The questionnaire included several questions such as gender, age, years of study etc. The supervisors collected the forms and informed the subjects when and where they could come and receive their payment. The whole procedure took about 45 minutes.
Hypotheses
According to standard theoretical predictions participants of treatments with higher incentives exhibit a higher performance. Explicitly we consider higher point scorings to approximate higher effort choices. The participants in the treatments with the fixed wage are expected to exert the lowest effort level. Members of the LI treatments should perform better than members of the NI treatments while participants of the HI treatments exert even more effort and therefore are supposed to yield the best result independent of task. This relation can be expressed by
Considering motivation crowding theory things appear different. Due to the multitude of different effects an unambiguous prediction is difficult to make. Assuming that for small interventions the crowding out effect dominates the price effect but for high participants of all treatments worked in one single room in the session at the University of Cologne. This measure was implemented to eliminate room effects. 10 A translated version of the instructions is available from the author on request. 11 Data on subjects who did not fill in the questionnaire were extracted from the sample. That was necessary because they might have continued working on the tasks, which adulterates their scores. Results Table 2 in the appendix presents the averages of points scored in the different treatments at the University of Bonn and Cologne. As presented in Figure 1 the median number of points in three of four cases show that effort increases from no incentive to low incentive treatments. According to standard theory this outcome is not surprising. Yet it seems to contradict Gneezy/Rustichini's (2000a) findings. They present an exactly opposite result since their fix paid treatment outperformed their low incentive treatment.
Furthermore, results decrease in all cases comparing the LI and the HI group, which indicates lower effort choices with the HI treatments. This result cannot be explained by group and the HI group fall behind the LI group in both tasks. That is, subjects in the LI treatment achieve the best results independent of task.
Hence, it is obvious that the results contradict standard theoretical predictions. There is no monotonous increase of effort with the incentive parameter. We neither find an outcome similar to the results by Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a) It seems to be surprising that the Low Incentive Group outperformed the two other groups. In three of four cases they form a peak to which the other groups fall back.
The data were analyzed with median regression. This seems to be appropriate here as median regression minimizes the sum of absolute deviations instead of the sum of squared deviations. That makes it less sensitive towards outliers and thus is a better measure for the central tendency of the data 12 . As the data show several extreme scores the method fits very well with it 13 .
Data of both tasks and both universities were pooled for this analysis and the low incentive scheme was taken as a reference level of compensation. As stated above individual point scorings are used as proxy for exerted effort on the task. Estimates from Median Regression are presented in Table 4 .
The descriptive statistics illustrated that in three of four cases both deviations from the reference level of compensation (low incentive) lead to lower performance. And indeed, the high powered incentives lead to highly significant and sizeable negative effect on performance. The median regression shows that individuals in the HI treatments achieve significantly 5,47 points less than those in the LI treatments.
The decrease of effort with a higher rate of compensation seems to be the most interesting discovery within the data. Table 4 shows a negative and highly significant influence of the high incentive scheme on point scorings. In particular we can neither find an increase in scorings with changing from a low performance contingent compensation to a higher one nor a decrease in scoring comparing the fixed wage with a 12 For example there were subjects who had negative scorings in the IQT. 13 For an analysis by ordinary least squares see Table 5 in the appendix. A separate analysis of the Bonn and Cologne treatments is presented in Table 3 in the appendix. Investigating the figures of the Bonn treatments by median regression the coefficients for the dummy variables "High" is -5 significant at a 5 percent level of significance while the coefficient for the dummy variable "Fix" (fix wage) is -4 and weakly significant. (See Table 3 , first column) Results for the treatments conducted at the University of Cologne are similar but only the coefficient for the "High" Dummy is significant. 
Fix is a dummy variable indicating that an individual is member of the No Incentive Group. High is a dummy variable with value one if the individual is member of the High Incentive Group. IQ is a dummy variable with value one if the individual worked on the IQ-Test. Cologne is a dummy variable with value one if the individual participated in the session at the University of Cologne. Sem is the number of semesters the individual has already spent at university. Sem² is the squared number of semesters the individual has already spent at university.
small performance dependent compensation. As the results contrast Gneezy/Rustichini's (2000a) findings these experiments do not provide evidence for an undermining effect of incentives of the form described in the hypothesis in section 2.2. This seems to be even more visible considering that qualitatively similar outcomes occur independent of task.
Interpretation
A possible interpretation of the results could be an increasing crowding out effect with increasing strength of incentives. That is, the stronger the extrinsic incentive the more intrinsic motivation is crowded out causing reduced effort choices. However, this theory cannot explain the poor results of the NI group since this group's performance should at least be better than the LI group's. Another explanation might be a growing error rate with increasing incentives. Intuitively one could argue that participants might feel excited imagining a very high income. Therefore the implementation of a high piece rate might stimulate very high effort in quantity resulting in worse quality of performance and consequently more mistakes. In that case a rather high effort in quantity would cause the worse scorings of the HI group. However, the data do not confirm this conjecture. The distribution of given answers (correct and incorrect) is predominantly similar to the distribution of point scorings. There are no significant differences between error rates in different treatments. Therefore this explanation is not very plausible.
To us the most convincing interpretation seems to be a theory of reference dependent preferences meaning that the subjects had a certain reference income in mind when participating in the experiment. At the University of Bonn experiments are run regularly. It is a common habit for students to participate and earn extra money. It is well known that participation in experiments is remunerated with an average of 10€ 14 .
On the contrary students were not familiar with taking part in economic experiments at the University of Cologne at the time of the session. Therefore participants had to be recruited from undergraduate courses by reporting the average wage in the experiment of 10€. So in that case it was possible to influence the participants' expectations and generate an artificial reference level. Due to the design of the experiment it was not possible to earn 10€ for the NI group since their payment was independent of their performance. According to standard theory they did not have any incentive to work on the tasks at all. Participants in the LI group could earn a maximum wage of 7.40€ which is less than 10€. Still reaching this maximum income was very unlikely since the average number of points actually reached was much lower than the maximum. So it can be assumed that members of the LI group knew from the start that they would have to work hard and concentrated to get close to their reference wage. In contrast to that the HI group could reach the level of 10€ by attaining few points only. Consequently the LI group had to work a lot harder than the HI group and did so to reach the optimal utility level. In this approach the assumption is made that peoples` utility does not only refer to the absolute height but rather to the relative height of monetary compensations. After the reference level is reached the following growths relatively lose value. It follows that compared to the standard case less or no additional effort is rational after reaching the reference level, as costs would exceed utility gains from wage. The utility function increases linear in wage but develops a smaller slope as a reference wage is reached.
A reference wage hypothesis
The reference wage is defined as a point from where wages are evaluated. This might be a wage the agent expects or perceives to be appropriate for a certain task. After that point is reached the slope of the utility function flattens. Thus utility increases slower if wages exceed the reference point. Hence the extreme case would be a constant utility level v . That is, utility is independent of wage beyond the reference point.
The complete model is described in the next section.
The Model
Since the model described in this section is supposed to be a theoretical approach to explain the experimental results we do not calculate the optimal incentive scheme. We rather take a wage contract comparable to those in the experiment. Consequently, the wage contract is an assumption in the model rather than the theoretical result.
Assume a utility function, which is additive-separable of the form:
U(w,e)=v(w)-c(e),
where w represents wage and e denotes the agent's exerted effort. As shown in Figure 2 the slope of the utility function is discontinuous at value R
The value R represents the reference wage from which the agent evaluates the actual wage. Since s is less than 1, marginal utility from w is smaller beyond the reference point than below. Assessing the situation from the reference point R the agent is in a loss situation if the first inequality is met because she stays below it. If the second inequality is met she is in a win situation. As the agent is work-averse, effort exertion is 
Furthermore the optimal choice of effort is determined by the first order condition of the agent's objective function 15 . The first derivative of the corresponding objective function 
The first case determines the employee's optimal effort choice if it is located on the left hand side of the critical value. The second case presents the effort decision, if it is located exactly on the critical value. The third case shows the employee's effort decision if it is located right to the kink. The change of e* in the incentive parameter is presented in figure 3 . 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper the relation between incentives and effort choices has been examined. The experimental results show that effort does not inevitably increase with increasing incentives. Instead the opposite was the case in the experiments conducted, as higher incentives generated lower performance. Participants in the high incentive treatments yielded significantly less points than those in the low incentive treatments. As standard theory and motivation crowding theory fail to give a convincing explanation for these results a model presenting reference dependent utility is applied.
An open question is why there was no similar outcome to Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a) not even with the IQ treatments. A possible explanation is the difference in wage composition namely the ratio between fix and variable components of the wage.
Comparing Gneezy/Rustichini's (2000a) results to ours indicates that the composition of wages might have an essential influence on the impact of incentives and should be subject to further research.
Another interesting result is that the influence of specific task features seems to be (at least for our tasks) negligible since the outcome is qualitatively similar. A reason for that could possibly be that the differences between the tasks were too small to produce a measurable effect. The hypothesis of the IQ task generating more intrinsic motivation than the CN task cannot be confirmed. Neither the IQ task nor the CN task created a result, which could be interpreted as crowding out of intrinsic motivation. Nevertheless it is not understood that different tasks trigger off the same behavior. Still, the influence of task features cannot be resolved with these experiments.
The vital conclusion of the experiments described in this paper is not that incentives do not work, as it can be seen comparing the results of the no incentive and the low incentive treatments. Moreover the implication should be that incentives do work very well if the agent's income is below her reference income. Beyond this point however incentives may fail to provide more effort. Further evidence is necessary to confirm the hypothesis that participants, who were confronted with a higher variable pay, were quickly pleased with their wage. Nevertheless standard implications and the resulting practical advices must at least in some cases be doubted.
Still, a problematical question is what practical implications can actually be derived from the experiments, since they only admit suppositions on the participants' motives.
Yet the individual wage expectations seem to be important information required to provide optimal incentives. Hence, this paper cannot give advice for the design of an optimal compensation scheme. For this purpose, further examinations of the emergence, development and measurement of reference points is necessary. The comparison with Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a) also indicates that the ratio between fixed payment and incentive parameter might as well play an essential role with motivating employees.
Future research of this coherence might lead to interesting insights not only for the optimal height of incentives but also for the optimal composition of wages. For definition of the variables see Table 4 .
Proof of Proposition
Due to the strict concavity of the objective function and the assumption on the cost function there must be a unique internal optimum. Suppose that e* Consequently e* must be located right of which happens if It follows that in all other cases the agent chooses R e* e = .
q.e.d.
